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HUGO GROTIUS IN THE CONTEMPORARY MEMORY OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: SECULARISM, LIBERALISM, AND 
THE POLITICS OF RESTATEMENT AND DENIAL 
John D. Haskell∗ 
INTRODUCTION: GROTIUS AS NARRATIVE 
Hugo Grotius (1583–1645) frequently occupies the title, “‘father’ of 
international law.”1 While the origins of professional lineage were a source of 
professional and personal conflict for jurists in the nineteenth century, scholars 
today tend to treat Grotius as either a symbolic marker of changing historical 
thought, or the symbolic figure of a style or school of global governance.2 In 
the first instance, Grotius is important because he made a methodological leap 
in one form or another from a theological to a secular frame of jurisprudential 
thinking, and in so doing, characterized the dilemmas of governance in familiar 
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University of Helsinki; Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, International University College, Turin; Assistant 
Director, Institute for the Study of Political Economy and Law, International University College, Turin; 
Visiting Lecturer of Law, University of London, School of Oriental and African Studies, 2011; Visiting 
Researcher, Institute for Global Law and Policy, Harvard Law School; Co-founder of the Centre for the study 
of Colonialism, Empire and International Law; Ph.D. Candidate in Law; LL.M., School of Oriental and 
African Studies, University of London; J.D., Hastings College of the Law, University of California. I am 
deeply grateful to the generosity, encouragement and thoughts of first and foremost Peter Fitzpatrick, Mark 
Janis, and David Kennedy, as well as Saki Bailey, Jason Beckett, José María Beneyto, Bill Bowring, Stephen 
Chan, Matthew Craven, Catriona Drew, Florian Hoffmann, Rob Knox, Boris Mamlyuk, Susan Marks, Ugo 
Mattei, Scott Newton, Umut Özsu, Reut Paz, Evita Rackow, Ignacio de la Rasilla del Moral, Akbar Rasulov, 
Joseph Singer, and Mai Taha. I also wish to express my thanks to the Institute for Global Law and Policy, the 
Institute for the study of Political Economy and Law, and the Centre for the study of Colonialism, Empire and 
International Law. All the usual caveats concerning errors and omissions apply. 
 1 Mark W. Janis, Religion and the Literature of International Law: Some Standard Texts, in RELIGION 
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 121, 121 (Mark W. Janis & Carolyn Evans eds., 1999). 
 2 See GESINA H.J. VAN DER MOLEN, ALBERICO GENTILI AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 61–62 (2d ed. 1968); see also infra notes 3–4 and accompanying text. In the 1870s, international jurists 
entered into heated contests over who deserved the right to be claimed the “father” of international law. Id. For 
instance, a group of jurists, including Asser, Holland, Mancini, and Twiss, drafted a resolution and formed a 
committee to erect a national monument in honor of Gentili. Pilgrimages were made to Gentili’s hometown, 
and the Italian government officially requested the United Kingdom for his remains (the grave, however, was 
unable to be located). VAN DER MOLEN, supra. Other international jurists, such as A.J. Levy, objected, arguing 
that Grotius should have the honor of having his statue erected first. Id. at 62. An English committee was 
formed in 1875 to add weight to the argument for honoring Gentili first, with Prince Leopold sitting as the 
honorary president and Phillimore carrying out the actual presidential duties. Id. 
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terms to modernity.3 For other authors, the legacy of Grotius is not directly this 
shift from ecclesiastic to secular authority, but rather that his efforts are 
remembered to spark the political aspiration, implied to be at the core of 
international law itself, towards a more liberal tolerance of difference and a 
sentiment of restraint towards over-aggrandizing political agendas.4 
These two contemporary streams of remembrance operate within a dense 
background of assumptions about the nature and possibilities of the global 
order, which raise at least three sets of curiosities. First, in light of nuanced 
scholarship of Grotius’s primary materials in recent decades, what does an 
emphasis on the actual content of Grotius’s work impart about the character of 
his times, and through what lens should we organize our understanding (e.g., 
political, juridical, theological, and so on)? Second, what inspires the almost 
cyclical (or perhaps more perversely, fetishistic) attraction to Grotius in the 
fields of international law and politics, and how might this help us better 
understand both the psychological and structural underpinnings of 
contemporary practice and the nature and trajectory of the profession in a 
broader sense? And third, in lieu of any findings, what, if any, possibility does 
this attraction to Grotius open up for future strategic, or even imaginative 
engagement? In sum, what stories does the Grotian rhetoric allow us to tell 
about the international legal order, and do such stories carry any political, if 
not personal, impact? 5 
 
 3 See Hilaire McCoubrey, Natural Law, Religion and the Development of International Law, in 
RELIGION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 177, 183–85 (Mark W. Janis & Carolyn Evans eds., 1999) (arguing that 
the Grotian revolution, albeit an organic development from what had gone before, led to a change to the modes 
of more contemporary and secular discourse). In the nineteenth century, Grotius was primarily remembered for 
a theory of human sociability whereby cosmopolitan society stood in for the “state of nature.” See infra note 6 
and accompanying text. In the twentieth century, Grotius is often recalled as a narrative device to capture what 
is seen as the historical shift from the insulated hierarchical authority of the Church and Emperor to a rapidly 
expanding international system of formally equal sovereign states based on normative rules of general 
agreement. See infra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 4 See Benedict Kingsbury & Adam Roberts, Introduction: Grotian Thought in International Relations, 
in HUGO GROTIUS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 1, 8–9, 13 (Hedley Bulls, Benedict Kingsbury & Adam 
Roberts eds., 1990) (describing the concept of solidarity and toleration of differences that are clearly 
discernible in Grotius’s writings); see also EDWARD KEENE, BEYOND THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: 
COLONIALISM AND ORDER IN WORLD POLITICS 143–44 (2002). 
 5 Without playing into any post-modern angst, it is productive to keep in mind David Kennedy’s 
injunction that the very act of analyzing the past (not to mention casting judgment on it) is to do violence to the 
doctrinal and theoretical content of earlier scholarship and can often misguide us to think that our vision is 
somehow more sophisticated and less contradictory. See David Kennedy, Primitive Legal Scholarship, 27 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 95–98 (1986). 
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It is these questions that this Article attempts to grapple with, in the hopes 
of providing a concise synthesis of the various engagements within the Grotian 
tradition to better understand the imaginative contours of our contemporary 
professional vocabularies and reflect on any emancipatory possibilities this 
might open up. What seems particularly striking is while ever more scholarship 
exposes a strong empirical dissonance in respect to the memory of Grotius, 
such representations continue to exercise a powerful sway over ongoing 
discussions about the past, present, and future of global governance. In 
response, this Article is organized into three themes which overlap in some 
respects, but are nevertheless helpful in parceling out the various approaches 
and motivations at work in the literature. Parts I and II provide an overview 
and then a revisionist account of the claims to what might be labeled the turn to 
“the secular” and “liberal tolerance.” In Part III, this Article moves to reflect 
more broadly on the implications of this attraction, attempting particularly to 
deduce some possible motivations for the continuous misreading of Grotius’s 
actual work. In conclusion, this Article briefly traces out some initial 
suggestions about an alternative future towards the legacy of the Grotian 
tradition, which might be characterized as a shift from a politics of restatement 
and denial to a politics of truth. 
I. THE SECULARIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
In the first contemporary stream of argument, Grotius is viewed as setting 
forth a secularized restatement of natural law whereby political ethics now 
becomes capable of articulation independent of any theological premise. In the 
first half of the twentieth century, though still prevalent in mainstream 
literature,6 this claim was typically supported by pointing to an early quotation 
 
 6 See, e.g., Deborah Baumgold, Pacifying Politics: Resistance, Violence, and Accountability in 
Seventeenth-Century Contract Theory, 21 POL. THEORY 6, 9 (1993); see also ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, A CONCISE 
HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 105 (1947) [hereinafter NUSSBAUM, CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF 
NATIONS] (“[Grotius] made an important step toward the emancipation of international law from theology by 
his famous pronouncement [about] the law of nature.”); Josef L. Kunz, Natural-Law Thinking in the Modern 
Science of International Law, 55 AM. J. INT’L L. 951, 951–52 (1961) (“The Protestant Grotius, who wrote the 
first treatise on international law, was still strongly influenced by the traditional natural law, but he secularized 
it by stating that natural law would be valid even if there were no God. This secularization profoundly changed 
the character of natural law. . . . [T]he Catholic natural law is . . . discovered by man’s recta ratio—a term 
stemming from the Stoics; yet . . . it necessarily presupposes the Christian faith in the Creator . . . . [W]ith 
Grotius this right reason becomes the basis of natural law.”); Arthur Nussbaum, Just War—A Legal Concept?, 
42 MICH. L. REV. 453, 466 (1943) (“[Grotius] claimed in earnest that the law of nations and international law 
derived therefrom could subsist without a divine foundation.”); Roscoe Pound, Grotius in the Science of Law, 
19 AM. J. INT’L L. 685, 686 (1925) (arguing that Grotius, along with other Protestant jurists, helped sever 
theology from jurisprudential thought). 
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from De Jure Belli ac Pacis: “What we have been saying would have a degree 
of validity even if we should concede that which cannot be conceded without 
the utmost wickedness, that there is no God, or that the affairs of men are of no 
concern to Him.”7 More recent scholarship has radically undermined this line 
of argument, pointing out that Grotius’s intent here was not to push 
Christendom towards some agnostic reappraisal of political order, but quite 
paradoxically, to silence the seventeenth century Pyrrhonic skepticism of 
God’s existence by demonstrating that Christianity was left unscathed even 
through the use of human “right reason.”8 In addition to his voluminous work 
in the field of Christian apologetics and tragedy-dramas based on biblical 
figures,9 scholars have typically pointed to the very next line following 
Grotius’s famous passage as proof of his religious conviction: 
The very opposite of this view [that there is no God, or that the 
affairs of men are of no concern to Him] has been implanted in us 
partly by reason, partly by unbroken tradition, and confirmed by 
many proofs as well as by miracles attested by all ages. Hence it 
follows that we must without exception render obedience to God as 
our Creator . . . .10 
 
 7 Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres, in 2 CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 13 (James 
B. Scott ed., Francis W. Kelsey et al. trans., William S. Hein & Co. 1995) (1646). 
 8 See William George, Grotius, Theology, and International Law: Overcoming Textbook Bias, 14 J.L. & 
RELIGION 605, 605–31 (1999) (providing a useful overview of the various positions and issues without falling 
into more traditional misreadings of Grotius, and situating Grotius within a larger return of interest in 
international legal history and religion); see also JEROME B. SCHNEEWIND, THE INVENTION OF AUTONOMY: A 
HISTORY OF MODERN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 66–81 (1998); Kennedy, supra note 5, at 79–81. 
 9 Grotius’s religious works include the tragedies, HUGO GROTIUS, THE ADAMUS EXUL OF GROTIUS 
(Francis Barham trans., 1839) (1601) and HUGO GROTIUS, CHRIST’S PASSION (George Sandys ed. & trans., 
1640) (1608); his commentaries on the Old and New Testament, HUGONIS GROTII, ANNOTATIONES IN VETUS 
& NOVUM TESTAMENTUM (Samuel Moody ed., 1727) (1650); and his Christian apologetics, Hugo Grotius, A 
Defence of the Catholic Faith Concerning the Satisfaction of Christ Against Faustus of Sienna, in 36 
BIBLIOTECA SACRA (Edward A. Park et al. eds., Frank H. Foster trans., W.F. Draper 1879) (1617) and HUGO 
GROTIUS, THE TRUTH OF CHRISTIANITY (Spencer Madan trans., E. Piercy 1797) (1627). 
 10 Grotius, supra note 7, at 13. In fact, this mode of argument did not originate with Grotius, but was a 
common technique among earlier Catholic jurists. For instance, in making his case for the theologian as the 
authoritative final word of the law of nature, Suárez writes, 
[E]ven if God did not exist, or if He did not make use of reason, or if He did not judge of things 
correctly, nevertheless, if the same dictates of right reason dwelt within man, constantly assuring 
him, for example, that lying is evil, those dictates would still have the same legal character which 
they actually possess because they would constitute a law pointing out that evil exists 
intrinsically in the object. 
FRANCISCO SUÁREZ, ON LAW AND ON GOD THE LAWGIVER, reprinted in THE CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: SELECTIONS FROM THREE WORKS OF FRANCISCO SUÁREZ, S.J., 3, 190 (James Brown Scott ed., Gwladys 
L. Williams et al. trans., 1944) (1621). 
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In response, scholars that mark off Grotius as a “great pioneer of modern 
thinking” maintain that these various appeals to Christianity are not 
confessions of deep religiosity, but an agnostic strategy to win over Christian 
populations and their leaders.11 For legal historians, such as Richard Tuck, 
Grotius’s work falls within the humanist tradition and its emphasis upon the 
inescapability of the aggressive and self-interested nature of humanity, and 
therefore, was, unsurprisingly, largely motivated by Grotius’s personal 
commitments to Dutch colonialism (which, in its expansion, was coming into 
increasingly contact with foreign cultures) and his own family’s economic 
advantage (as Dutch shareholders in the East India Company).12 
To some extent, at least at first glance, Grotius’s minimal Christianity does 
seem an agnostic effort to find a common settlement between societies with 
competing jurisdictions, laws, and religious doctrines. In laying out the 
fundamental tenets of Christianity, Grotius shied away from all sectarian 
doctrines that might have upset relationships between Dutch Protestants and 
Spanish and Portuguese Catholics, whereby in place of any talk about the 
Trinity or the need for redemption, all that remains are a relatively tame set of 
tenets: there is a single God that actually cares for all humanity and sits unseen 
in judgment over their behavior; Jesus is the resurrected Son of God; and the 
faithful will enjoy everlasting life after death, while the wicked will be 
punished.13 Moreover, his theorizing on the laws pertaining to warfare did not 
follow the scholastic tradition of limiting (or even prohibiting) war, but on the 
contrary, seemed to argue adamantly for rather cynical, almost amoral 
principles of behavior for both individuals and states: states and individuals 
aspire to sociability, but are equally prone to violent clashes of self-interest; the 
possession of natural rights allows for autonomous free will, but also the 
legitimacy of contracting oneself or community into slavery.14 Though 
 
 11 This is a common theme explicitly or implicitly taken up by a great number of authors. See, e.g., 
ERNST CASSIRER, THE MYTH OF THE STATE 172 (Yale Univ. Press 1969) (1946); MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM 
APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT 73–83 (1989); SCHNEEWIND, 
supra note 8, at 65–81; RICHARD TUCK, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE: POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE 
INTERNATIONAL ORDER FROM GROTIUS TO KANT 78–108 (1999) [hereinafter TUCK, THE RIGHTS OF WAR]. 
 12 See TUCK, THE RIGHTS OF WAR, supra note 11, at 78–108. Others have also adopted more cynical 
readings of Grotius, arguing that his reasoning was not founded on any ideological, intellectual, or ethical 
basis, but more directly, to serve his own material and political interests. See, e.g., Georg Schwarzenberger, 
The Grotius Factor in International Law and International Relations: A Functional Approach, in HUGO 
GROTIUS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 301, 301–12 (Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsbury & Adam Roberts 
eds., 1990). 
 13 For a useful, but concise overview of Grotius’s religious tenets, see SCHNEEWIND, supra note 8, at  
65–81. 
 14 Id. at 80–81. 
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Christian sovereigns are to refrain from barbarity in their military hostilities 
with one another, in a move foreshadowing later French colonial justifications, 
they have both the divine and natural sanction to invade and conquer foreign 
territory by whatever means necessary under the pretext of the “benefit of 
human society.”15 Thus, Grotius’s willingness to discover natural law in the 
practices of sovereigns, the subjectivization of just-cause rationale in warfare, 
as well as his prolific use of ancient classical authorities to arrive at conflicting 
opinions, suggest on some level that his ultimate decision to locate normative 
authority in a universal, divinely willed framework was less an agreement with 
prior scholastic theologians and jurists, than the afterthought of a humanist to 
make his theories palpable to a Christian-colored political order.16 
Upon closer inspection, however, to claim Grotius as some “avant-garde of 
secular jurisprudence” is to suppress the overall tenor of his writings and 
personal beliefs, as well as to miss the strong thematic linkages between his 
“secular” work and the “profoundly Christian” traditions of the Protestant 
humanists and late medieval Catholic jurists.17 First, the minimal Christianity 
he expounds in both his political polemic concerning warfare, De Jure Belli ac 
Pacis, and his Christian apologetics, The Truth of the Christian Religion, is not 
simply an agnostic strategy to woo Christian states, but very much in keeping 
with his own personal religious convictions as a Remonstrant and a pupil in 
Leiden under Arminius. Grotius was both a diplomat and theologian by 
professional calling,18 politically repressed along with other Remonstrant 
members by Calvinist forces in the Netherlands,19 and condemned to life 
imprisonment (though his wife engineered his daring escape by smuggling him 
out of prison in a suitcase).20 Accordingly, Grotius’s avoidance of points of 
 
 15 See id. at 71–72, 80–81; RICHARD TUCK, NATURAL RIGHTS THEORIES: THEIR ORIGIN AND 
DEVELOPMENT 58–81 (1977) [hereinafter TUCK, NATURAL RIGHTS]; TUCK, THE RIGHTS OF WAR, supra note 
11, at 102–04. 
 16 The humanist, or “oratorical,” tradition “drew most extensively on the literary and rhetorical writings 
of the ancient world,” and, in a skeptical register, commonly employed the rhetorical technique of “leaving the 
reader rather unclear about where the author stood.” TUCK, THE RIGHTS OF WAR, supra note 11, at 16–17; see 
also TUCK, NATURAL RIGHTS, supra note 15, at 58–81. 
 17 See WILHELM G. GREWE, THE EPOCHS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 195 (Michael Byers trans., 2005); see 
also Kennedy, supra note 5, at 79. 
 18 See Hedley Bull, The Importance of Grotius in the Study of International Relations, in HUGO GROTIUS 
AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 65, 67–70 (Hedley Bull, Benedict Kinsbury & Adam Roberts eds., 1990). 
 19 Janis, supra note 1, at 218. 
 20 Hugo Grotius Escape from Prison, HISTORYOFLAW.INFO, http://www.historyoflaw.info/hugo-grotius-
escape-from-prison.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2011). 
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doctrine was not conceived as a neutral position, but firmly understood to be a 
religious polemic in favor of a broad understanding of Christendom.21 
Second, Grotius’s rather “thin” conception of human sociability—whereby 
human nature wars between the desire for rational order amongst each other 
and conflicting self-interests22—was not some nascent twentieth century 
realpolitik that he applied evenly across the global spectrum: it was aimed 
particularly at accentuating the difference between Christian and non-Christian 
societies in accordance with the Protestant and Catholic humanist traditions 
from the late medieval and Reformation or Renaissance eras.23 In the Catholic 
tradition, the propaganda campaign for the anti-Turkish Crusades carried out 
by Pope Leo X (1513–21) produced a robust corpus of humanist jurisprudence 
that condemned warfare between Christian powers while justifying 
unrestrained warfare upon non-Christian societies.24 Humanist jurists, by the 
early sixteenth century, viewed inter-Christian warfare as potentially just for 
both Catholic and Protestant camps, falling into an almost Darwinian 
explanation of Providence’s design.25 The humanist jurist, François Connan, 
for instance, echoed his master, Andrea Alciato, in saying that “you can 
investigate and speculate all you like, but you will find no other  
reason . . . [than that] by a tacit law of nature the weaker give way to the more 
powerful; from which single principle all the laws of war derive.”26 In other 
words, Grotius’s distinction between just and formally legal wars was not by 
any means a “significant leap” from a unified conception of faith to a 
subjective agnosticism,27 but actually a popular technique among Christian 
 
 21 See, e.g., Janis, supra note 1, at 121–26; CHRISTOPH A. STUMPF, THE GROTIAN THEOLOGY OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: HUGO GROTIUS AND THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 241–43 
(2006) (stating that Grotius is indebted to the Christian theological and legal traditions to a great extent). 
 22 SCHNEEWIND, supra note 8, at 71–72. 
 23 See TUCK, THE RIGHTS OF WAR, supra note 11, at 16–17. 
 24 See id. at 29–31. For instance, Erasmus is remembered as a passionate advocate for peace, but in fact 
espoused a militant antipathy to non-Christians. “France alone remains not infected with heretics, with 
Bohemian schismatics, with Jews, with half-Jewish marranos, and untouched by the contagion of Turkish 
neighbours.” Id. at 30 (quoting Erasmus). In relation to a war against the Turks, Erasmus adopts a 
Machiavellian tone: 
[I]f war . . . is not wholly avoidable, that kind would be a lesser evil than the present unholy 
conflicts and clashes between Christians. If mutual love does not bind them together, a common 
enemy will surely unite them after a fashion, and there will be a sort of a common purpose, even 
if true harmony is lacking. 
Id. 
 25 See id. at 34–36. 
 26 Id. at 33 (quoting FRANÇOIS CONNAN, COMMENTARI IURIS CIVILIS (1538)). 
 27 See KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 11, at 81–82. 
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jurists and theologians to unify the populations and leaders around an external 
enemy, thereby preserving the balance of power within Christendom itself and 
guarding against any revolutionary uprising within its own territories.28 
Legitimate warfare to dismantle the status quo was bracketed outside of the 
domestic realm of Europe, whereas internal conflict could be characterized as 
illegitimate violence that demanded immediate police action to preserve what 
was in fact some mythical homogenous stability (though keeping open the 
possibility of exceptions, such as the Dutch towards the Spanish).29 
It is within his passages concerning the justifications and conditions of 
warfare, especially in relation to foreign non-European territories, that Grotius 
is perhaps most often misread as announcing the dawn of the modern secular 
regime of international law. In a characteristic excerpt that touches on some of 
the more popular themes said to point towards a secular understanding of 
politics and law, Grotius writes: 
Kings, and those who possess rights equal to those kings, have the 
right of demanding punishments not only on account of injuries 
committed against themselves or their subjects, but also on account 
of injuries which do not directly affect them but excessively violate 
the law of nature or of nations in regard to any persons whatsoever. 
For liberty to serve the interests of human society through 
punishments, which originally, as we have said, rested with 
individuals, now after the organization of states and courts of law is 
in the hands of the highest authorities . . . . [W]e follow the opinion 
of Innocent, and others who say that war may be waged upon those 
who sin against nature. The contrary view is held by Victoria, 
Vázquez, Azor, Molina, and others, who in justification of war seem 
to demand that he who undertakes it should have suffered injury 
either in his person or his state, or that he should have jurisdiction 
over him who is attacked. For they claim that the power of punishing 
 
 28 See supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text. 
 29 See, e.g., MARTIN WIGHT, FOUR SEMINAL THINKERS IN INTERNATIONAL THEORY: MACHIAVELLI, 
GROTIUS, KANT, AND MAZZINI 29–62 (2005) (covering a number of seminal themes in Grotius’s work and 
describing Grotius’s conception of an inner and outer conception of political identity: the outer circle that 
which embraces all humanity under natural law and an inner circle of the corpus Christianorum bound by laws 
of Christ, and at least in part defined in their unity against Turkish populations). Though not typically brought 
together, Grotius’s understanding and strategy of political identity seems to bear a close relationship to Carl 
Schmitt, another figure who has become a trendy academic figure of study over the past two decades. See, e.g., 
CARL SCHMITT, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL (George Schwab trans., 2007); CARL SCHMITT, THE NOMOS 
OF THE EARTH IN THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE JUS PUBLICUM EUROPAEUM (G.L. Ulmen ed. & trans., 
2003) [hereinafter THE NOMOS]. 
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is the proper effect of civil jurisdiction, while we hold that it also is 
derived from the law of nature.30 
The passage carries a distinctly modern feel à la Clausewitz: warfare is not 
simply a necessary evil that comes with humanity’s sinful nature as would be 
the case with Hobbes, rather it is the very continuation of law by other 
means.31 War is litigation, or at the very least, wrapped up in juristic 
exercises—what Kennedy has discussed in the modern context of the 
American military as “lawfare.”32 Moreover, the rejection of the neo-scholastic 
tradition suggests both a prima facie rejection of faith in the hierarchies and 
dogma of medieval Christendom, and at least a hesitant step away from any 
overarching normative natural order towards a positivist regime of subjective 
reciprocal rights held by competing sovereign entities.33 To be sure, the “law 
of nature” is still referenced, but it is now coterminous with the “law of 
nations,” and in the place of ecclesiastic authorities imposing the wishes of the 
divine, sovereignty now seems to take an anthropological turn whereby it is 
left to secular rulers to mete out material punishments on behalf of the “benefit 
of human society.” 
This, however, does not seem to actually be the case: the turn to 
subjectivity and the emphasis on state sovereignty had nothing to do with any 
atheistic or agnostic turn in intellectual disposition, but in fact orthodoxies of 
the Protestant Reformation initiated by Luther and his jurist comrades. 
Concerning subjectivity and the distancing from ecclesiastic authority, Luther 
argued against the Church as a mediator between the sinner and God, and 
instead presented the laity itself as the living Church, and each believer their 
own priest.34 On the one hand, this meant that each individual, as their own 
“lord,” was granted “the splendid privilege” of “inestimable power and 
 
 30 See Grotius, supra note 7, at 504–05. 
 31 See generally CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 90–99 (Michael Eliot Howard & Peter Pare eds. & 
trans., 1984) (describing war, the decision by force of arms, as the supreme law). 
 32 DAVID KENNEDY, OF WAR AND LAW 12 (2006); see also Nathaniel Berman, Privileging Combat? 
Contemporary Conflict and Legal Construction of War, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1 (2004). 
 33 See Knud Haakonssen, Hugo Grotius and the History of Political Thought, 13 POL. THEORY 239, 240 
(1985) (“Grotius’ most important contribution to modern theory was his theory of rights . . . . Instead of being 
something that an action or state of affairs or a category of these is when it is in accordance with law . . . ius is 
seen by Grotius as something that a person has. . . . The concept becomes ‘subjectivized,’ centered on the 
person.”). See generally TUCK, NATURAL RIGHTS, supra note 15, at 58–81. 
 34 JOHN WITTE, LAW AND PROTESTANTISM: THE LEGAL TEACHINGS OF THE LUTHERAN REFORMATION 
95–97 (2002). 
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liberty.”35 Drawing here upon the tradition set by thirteenth and fourteenth 
century Catholic theologian reformers,36 Luther anticipates Grotius (if not 
Kierkegaard), to celebrate the subjective Christian experience of “the inner 
man” who nurtures faith away from the sinful crowd.37 In this sense, the 
Lutheran movement (which would be carried further in Calvinism) swept away 
the Church as the locus and vehicle of the sacred with its emphasis on the 
necessity of salvation through a wholehearted personal adhesion. On the other 
hand, however, the priestly calling brought not only freedom, but also the 
responsibility to imitate the example of Christ in everyday life, a duty of 
sociability, and positive reciprocal care.38 Luther reminds us that “Christ has 
made it possible for us, provided we believe in him, to be not only his brethren, 
co-heirs, and fellow-kings, but also his fellow-priests . . . . A man does not live 
for himself alone, he lives only for others,” and not only for the living, but also 
to owe fidelity—an almost Aristotelian sociability so famous in Grotius’s own 
legacy—to all the Christian believers who had already died, the “saints in 
heaven.”39 Thus, while the Church itself had lost is central mediating role, 
 
 35 See id. at 95; see also HAROLD BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION II: THE IMPACT OF THE PROTESTANT 
REFORMATIONS ON THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION (2003). 
 36 At least as early as Norman Anonymous and John de Salisbury, various more critical theological 
traditions within Catholicism (and in early Protestantism with the writings of authors like Johann Oldendorp 
who would provide detailed lists of instances where the citizen’s conscience might require disobedience of 
civil authorities) emphasized the role of the citizen in both political and religious life. See generally A 
SOURCEBOOK IN CHRISTIAN POLITICAL THOUGHT: FROM IRENAEUS TO GROTIUS (Oliver O’Donovan & Joan 
Lockwood O’Donovan eds., 1999) [hereinafter A SOURCEBOOK]; see also HAROLD BERMAN, LAW AND 
REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 1–45 (1983). In the dominant historical 
and legal literature, the rise of the individual is conveniently located somewhere in the fifteenth or sixteenth 
century, helping to mark the transition into the modern era of some emancipated existence (whether that is 
articulated on the formal horizontal equality of sovereign states or the subjectivity of personal experience that 
undermines any objective normative order). A SOURCEBOOK, supra, at 389–547. When scholars talk about the 
pre-modern era, the concepts of the individual and community are largely non-existent, either suppressed 
beneath an imperial-religious logic or simply not yet even within the imaginative framework to be grasped in 
the first place. See generally id. However, what one in fact witnesses in the pre-modern period is not only an 
awareness of both individual and social components of political life, but a militancy that feels shockingly 
radical to standard liberal democratic notions of civil society, at least since the aftermath of the French and 
American Revolutions. See generally id. While individuals were to submit to the authority of their leaders, 
even when they strongly disagreed, they also had the divine obligation to excommunicate their leadership, 
body, or soul, under a variety of conditions. See generally id. Emphasizing seventeenth century notions of 
social contract (e.g., Locke, organic political theory) or placing absolute sovereign authority in the nation state 
(e.g., Bodin, Hobbes) potentially robs the vitality and agency given to people in older, more radical traditions 
of individualism and social consciousness. 
 37 WITTE, supra note 34, at 95. 
 38 Id. at 95–97. 
 39 See id. at 95–96 (quoting Luther); see also PAUL ALTHAUS, THE THEOLOGY OF MARTIN LUTHER 
(1966). In some respects, this seems to anticipate later jurists in the nineteenth century who claimed their work 
as part of an organic heritage of the dead, the living, and future generations. 
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salvation continued to be at least implicitly premised on connections to a wider 
order, only the sacramental life was now brought into the daily vocations and 
relationships between the citizenry and its government so that our 
understanding of “the good” would only be discoverable within human life. 
By denying the distinction between the sacred and the profane, the 
anthropological turn that came into focus more fully with Grotius, therefore, 
does not mark a turning away from Christian thought, but rather its 
interpenetration into the routine activities of this life. Instrumental rationality 
takes on fresh importance as the very act of coming to God, as well as the 
marker of actively belonging to a shared political community.40 As Kennedy 
observes, Grotius’s willingness to “find natural law in the practices of 
sovereigns” is not so much any “relocation of normative authority from divine 
to sovereign will” but that “natural law accords with and is binding as a matter 
of divine law” whereby the sovereign may be the source or vehicle, but by no 
means the origin of the law of nations.41 Writing during what was in many 
ways the tail end of the Protestant Reformation, the turn to secular authorities 
in Grotius’s text again displays a characteristically Lutheran tenet: that the 
specific practices and rules of the territorialized secular administrations were in 
fact albeit imperfect the manifestation, or “mask,” of God’s will.42 Breaking 
from the scholastic tradition that human reason could prove the divine sanctity 
 
 40 This all looks increasingly familiar to our own contemporary period: sober, disciplined production and 
an attitude of civility that makes possible a life of commerce and acquisition now replace the aristocratic 
celebration of undisciplined ease and the warrior ethos of seeking personal glory. For studies that circle around 
this theme in relation to capitalism and religion, see generally PHILIP GOODCHILD, CAPITALISM AND RELIGION: 
THE PRICE OF PIETY 247–48 (2002) (“Where piety became invisible through the mechanisms of ideology, 
liberty and right became self-certifying values that shaped human relations for the market, and thus for the 
advent of capitalism.”); BOYD HILTON, THE AGE OF ATONEMENT: THE INFLUENCE OF EVANGELICALISM ON 
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC THOUGHT, 1785–1865, at 36–70 (1991) (discussing evangelical economics); STUARD 
PIGGIN, MAKING EVANGELICAL MISSIONARIES 245 (1985) (arguing that missionaries played a significant role 
in the Enlightenment confidence in human reason and the ethical value of efficiency and usefulness); R.H. 
TAWNEY, RELIGION AND THE RISE OF CAPITALISM 277–87 (1926) (tracing the rise of capitalism back to the 
medieval era); CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF MODERN IDENTITY 211–47 (1989); 
MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 13–31 (Talcott Parsons trans., 1930); 
WILLIAM WRIGHT, CAPITALISM, THE STATE, AND THE LUTHERAN REFORMATION 246 (1988) (naming 
Lutheranism as the main factor behind the protection of the common man in the name of the common good). 
 41 See Kennedy, supra note 5, at 79. 
 42 See BERMAN, supra note 35, at 157. For Luther, God is “hidden” in the earthly kingdom and only 
appears to humanity through the “masks” of human reason and will, the rule of law and its political officers, 
and in the conscientious work of believers. Id. The civil law, therefore, not only expresses the natural 
limitations and needs of humanity, but also serves, in the words of St. Paul, as “our schoolmaster to bring us 
unto Christ,” teaching and coercing humanity both to civil and spiritual morality. See WITTE, supra note 34, at 
92–175 (discussing these ideas in the teachings of Luther, Melanchthon, Eisermann, and Oldendrop) 
(emphasis omitted). 
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of moral propositions, Luther’s colleague, the eminent Philip Melanchthon 
argued that God has implanted certain “elements of knowledge,” whereby 
humanity could use reason to discern the general principles of God’s will, but 
only imperfectly.43 For Melanchthon, the state had the duty “of transforming 
the general principles of natural law into detailed rules of positive law” that 
could meet the “practical considerations of social utility and the common 
good,” what he called nothing other than “rational positive law.”44 In other 
words, “rational positive law” straddled the line between Earth and heaven: on 
the one hand, it was the divine will of God manifesting through the deliberate 
labor of the faithful; on the other hand, carried out under the limitations of 
humanity’s sinful nature, it was a never-ending, always incomplete quest for 
perfection, which could only seek the eternal through its preoccupation with 
the “political, economic, and social needs in given times and places.”45 Thus, 
for the Protestant lineage of jurists, including Grotius, the violation of the 
fundamental laws of nature or of nations is therefore not an end in itself, but 
rather an extension of some violation against divine foundation of existence. 
II. THE RISE OF POLITICAL LIBERALISM 
In the second stream of argument, Grotius earns the title “father of 
international law” for advocating what is said to be a liberal universalism that 
embraced diverse religious and political forms (often claimed nowadays as a 
central tenet of modern international law), sometimes called the “Grotian 
tradition.”46 In this vision, the losers are the medieval res publica Christiana, 
symbolized by the Holy Roman Empire and the Catholic Church, as its 
“objective hierarchy of normative meaning” gives way to a pristine European 
order of nation-states premised on “sovereign equality, religious agnosticism 
 
 43 WITTE, supra note 34, at 123–40. 
 44 Id. at 129–30. Melanchthon was perhaps the leading jurist of the Reformation, drafting the chief 
declaration of Lutheran theology, the Augsburg Confession and its Apology, and a co-author of the 
Scmalkaldic Articles, along with writing dozens of instructional books and biblical commentaries. For a 
discussion of Melanchthon’s legal theory, see BERMAN, supra note 35, at 77–87; WITTE, supra note 34, at 
121–40. 
 45 BERMAN, supra note 35, at 82. Reut Paz’s study of early twentieth century and interwar Jewish-
German jurists provides an interesting discussion of the idea of international law as a “ladder” between 
humanity and God, drawing persuasively upon a mix of Jewish religious thought, philosophy, and socio-
historical archival materials. See Reut Paz, A Gateway Between a Distant God and a Cruel World: The 
Contribution of 20th Century Jewish German Speaking Scholars Erich Kaufmann, Hans Kelsen, Hersch 
Lauterpacht and Hans J. Morgenthau to the Professionalisation of International Law and International 
Relations (2008) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Bar-Ilan University) (on file with author). 
 46 See Hersch Lauterpacht, The Grotian Tradition in International Law, 23 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 24–25 
(1946). 
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and balance of powers.”47 In a classic description of this claim in relation to 
Grotius’ political liberalism, Lauterpacht writes in the immediate aftermath of 
the Second World War: 
[Let us] explain the significance . . . of the Grotian tradition in the 
history of the law of nations. He secularized the law of nature. He 
gave it added authority and dignity by making it an integral part of 
the exposition of a system of law which became essential to civilized 
life. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . The place which the law of nature occupies as part of the Grotian 
tradition is distinguished not only by the fact of its recognition of a 
source of law different from and, in proper cases, superior to the will 
of sovereign states. . . . [But it is] largely based on and deduced from 
the nature of man as a being intrinsically moved by a desire for social 
life, endowed with an ample measure of goodness, altruism, and 
morality, and capable of acting on general principles of learning from 
experience. . . . [And it is for] peaceful and organized life according 
to the measure of his intelligence.48 
Lauterpacht sees the Grotian spirit of international law, which he must have 
considered as particularly relevant to an European landscape torn asunder by 
nationalist passion and violent superstitions, to function as a restraining 
influence on political aggression, as well as the source and articulation of 
morality (“endowed with . . . goodness, altruism and morality”) and knowledge 
 
 47 See KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 11, at 71–157 (encoding a series of linear movements, from the ancient 
to the modern, from belief to rationality, from objectivity to subjectivity, from hierarchical to democratic or 
plural models of authority, and so on). For an emphasis on a similar set of founding positions, see GREWE, 
supra note 17, at 20–29, 143, 170, 291 (noting the importance of the balance of power, formal equality, and 
religious tolerance in de-centering the authority of the Pope and Emperor); THE NOMOS, supra note 29, at 140–
54 (focusing on the “detheologization of public life” in response to “creedal civil wars” through a horizontal 
organization of formally equal territorial European states intent to maintain a balance of power). 
 48 Lauterpacht, supra note 46, at 24. Resurrecting the Grotian tradition of Hersch Lauterpacht, Martti 
Koskenniemi has characterized it as follows: 
It relies on the interlocutor’s willingness to take for granted the intrinsic rationality of a morality 
of sweet reasonableness, the non-metaphysical doctrine of the golden middle. . . . It is a morality 
of attitude—of seriousness. . . . It is a morality of tolerance and of personal and professional 
virtue. It is a morality of scales, controlled by the attempt to balance right with duty and freedom 
with reason. It is a morality of control and self-control, for which the greatest desire is the end of 
desire. 
Martti Koskenniemi, Lauterpacht: The Victorian Tradition in International Law, 8 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 215, 261 
(1997); see also Renée Jeffery, Hersch Lauterpacht, the Realist Challenge and the ‘Grotian Tradition’ in 20th-
Century International Relations, 12 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 223, 223–50 (2006). 
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(“learning from experience”).49 Here, Lauterpacht adopts the traditional 
narrative that Grotius “secularized” the law of nations, which in turn, provided 
the groundwork for claiming international law as a detached process of 
peaceful resolution. In light of the discussion so far, one might be suspicious 
about Lauterpacht’s claim that international law emerged in the waning 
twilight of religion as a neutral, deliberative process devoid of religious or 
political prejudices. However, other scholars have specifically appealed to the 
religious, or at least spiritual, character of the Grotian tradition to claim 
international law as a tolerant, universalizing project in otherwise strikingly 
similar terms to Lauterpacht’s image. Writing only a few years after 
Lauterpacht, the British jurist and legal historian Arthur Nussbaum emphasizes 
the close link between the spiritual and liberal characters of Grotius’s work: 
A cognate trait of great importance was Grotius’  
tolerance. . . . Grotius, a pious Protestant writing at the time of the 
most savage of religious wars, refrained from any word which might 
have offended Catholic feeling. . . . [This expressed] his desire and 
hope for the reunion of the Christian churches. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . [It also] opened a new path by the doctrine of what he called the 
temperamenta of warfare. . . . [It] urged moderation for reasons of 
humanity, religion, and farsighted policy . . . . 
. . . . 
. . . From [his writing] emerges the picture of a man absorbed in his 
ideals, of a devout seeker after truth and right, and of a passionate 
and unswerving advocate of humaneness and conciliation—a picture 
borne out by his life. The spiritual light shining through the fabric of 
his work explains the success of his undertaking. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . His work has remained a living force. . . . The essence of his 
thought has passed into the conscience of the civilized world. His 
name has become a symbol of justice in international relations.50 
Nussbaum’s claim is more radical than what Lauterpacht proposed, though 
it equally results in support for the idea that international law expounds a 
universalizing faith that can tolerate religious and political diversity. The 
argument is not the traditional claim made by international lawyers that the 
discipline became secular over time, and thereby was able to engage with 
religious passions in a detached, more enlightened way. Rather, in Nussbaum’s 
strain of argument, international law is part of a living Christian lineage, but it 
 
 49 Lauterpacht, supra note 46, at 24. 
 50 See NUSSBAUM, CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS, supra note 6, at 105–12. 
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is now this very religiosity itself which is seen as one of the key elements in 
international law’s ability to embrace a more universalist vision of 
emancipation and brotherhood. In more recent years, the American legal 
historian Mark Janis has eloquently argued for this version of the Grotian 
tradition: 
It was the imprisonment and exile of this religious and political 
liberal that both provided the time to write and inspired the theme of 
De Jure Belli ac Pacis. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . Trained and famed as a theologian as well as a jurist, Grotius 
unashamedly brought the Bible to the law of nations. It is important 
to note that Grotius brought religion to the discipline not to exclude 
other religious groups (be they Calvinists, Catholics, Jews or 
Moslems), but to show that his religion, a liberal and universal faith, 
proved that the law of nations was meant to include all peoples. 
. . . [Grotius believed in a] liberal Arminian universalism . . . [at] a 
time of religious wars among fiercely conservative faiths . . . . His 
was a more forgiving faith, but a faith nonetheless, that could tolerate 
religious diversity. Grotius employed this liberal religion as a critical 
source for proof of legal principles which could tolerate both 
religious and political diversity among the nations.51 
At first glance, the secular and religious version of the Grotian tradition of 
international law as a tolerant, civilizing force upon global governance seems 
to be affirmed in selective passages from De Jure Belli Pacis. Within the more 
secularist version of the tradition, Grotius seems to occasionally sweep away 
the primacy of the entire Christian normative order in favor of a formally 
equal, yet divergent, array of sovereign authorities: 
Just as, in fact, there are many ways of living, one being better than 
another, and out of so many ways of living each is free to select that 
which he prefers, so also a people can select the form of government 
it wishes; and the extent of its legal right in the matter is not to be 
measured by the superior excellence of this or that form of 
government, in regard to which different men hold different views, 
but by its free choice.52 
 
 51 See Janis, supra note 1, at 121–25. 
 52 HUGO GROTIUS, ON THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE 104 (Francis W. Kelsey trans., Clarendon Press 
1925) (1625). 
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Likewise, this same sort of liberalism also seems to crop up in more religious 
readings of the Grotian tradition, especially in his polemics in favor of the 
legitimacy of agreements between Christian and heathen states: 
[D]o we perhaps believe that we have nothing in common with 
persons who have not accepted the Christian faith? Such a belief 
would be very far removed from the pious doctrine of Augustine, 
who declares (in his interpretation of the precept of Our Lord 
whereby we are bidden to love our neighbours) that the term 
‘neighbours’ obviously includes every human  
being. . . . Accordingly, not only is it universally admitted that the 
protection of infidels from injury (even from injury by Christians) is 
never unjust, but it is furthermore maintained, by authorities who 
have examined this particular point [including Vitoria], that alliances 
and treaties with infidels may in many cases be justly contracted for 
the purpose of defending one’s own rights, too. Such a course of 
action was adopted (so we are told) by Abraham, Isaac, David, 
Solomon, and the Maccabees.53 
It is tempting to read these passages (as so many do) as the initial 
soundings of liberal political thought, sowing the first kernels of what have 
become the familiar ethics of disengaged, subjective rationality and formal 
equality of sovereign nation-states so important nowadays in the daily posture 
of international law. This temptation contains some validity, for Grotius was in 
some regards original in reconciling the nominalist tradition of William of 
Occam and Duns Scotus (arguing that the normative order originates in the 
will rather than some natural order) with the Thomist tradition espoused by late 
medieval scholastics (that the law of nature was absolutely perfect and did not 
allow for even divine derogation).54 In Grotius’s solution, the normative order 
still originates in the willed actions of the sovereign, but the will itself is now 
constrained to a procedural conception of reason and consent. However, we 
should be careful not to read this anachronistically through some modern 
liberal democratic conviction. On the one hand, Grotius’s passage advocating 
the freedom of society to choose its form of government was conditioned upon 
the understanding that society was premised on “rational order,” which was 
almost exclusively reserved to the practice and customs of Christian states 
(e.g., Dutch federation of states, the French state).55 Thus, for instance, if a 
 
 53 Hugo Grotius, De Iure Praedae Commentarius, in I CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 135 (James 
B. Scott ed., Gwladys L. Williams et al. trans., Williams S. Hein & Co. 1995) (1604). 
 54 See TUCK, THE RIGHTS OF WAR, supra note 11, at 78–108. See generally A SOURCEBOOK, supra note 
36. 
 55 See generally TUCK, THE RIGHTS OF WAR, supra note 11. 
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foreign territory did not structure land distribution around recognizable forms 
of industry and private property, Grotius argued the legal, if not moral, right of 
a conquering power to seize and use that land: 
[O]ur natural needs are satisfied with only a few things, which may 
be easily had without great labour or cost. As for what God has 
granted us in addition, we are commanded not to throw it into the sea 
(as some Philosophers foolishly asserted), nor to leave it 
unproductive . . . nor to waste it, but to use it to meet the needs . . . of 
other men, either by giving it away, or by lending it to those who ask; 
as is appropriate for those who believe themselves to be not  
owners . . . of these things, but representatives or stewards . . . of God 
the Father.56 
On the other hand, the argument that Christian states could enter into 
alliances and even protect infidels from violations against the laws of nature 
and nations was not a novel gesture of benevolent universalism, but firmly 
rooted within the Catholic humanist tradition (in direct contrast to the Thomist, 
Aristotelian, and Lutheran argument for smaller communities57) that came to 
prominence with the papacy of Leo X.58 As Tuck has unearthed, at the 
Colonial Conference of 1613 in London, an English diplomat sardonically 
noted in the margins of a pamphlet prepared by Grotius containing this very 
same argument, “we think it very honest to defend oppressed people, against 
their wills.”59 Indeed, for Grotius, not only could Christian nations conquer 
foreign lands for their own use, but also enslave them for their own good. 
‘“[Aristotle is correct] when he says that certain persons are by nature 
‘slaves,’” Grotius argues, ‘“[N]ot because God did not create man as a free 
being, but because there are some individuals whose character is such that it is 
expedient for them to be governed by another’s sovereign will rather than by 
their own.’”60 While Grotius contemplated that these liberties were reserved 
primarily in relation to European sovereign powers over non-Europeans, and 
 
 56 HUGO GROTIUS, THE TRUTH OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION 43, 119 (John Clarke trans., C. & R. 
Baldwin 1805) (1627).  
If there by any waste or barren Land within our Dominions, that also is to be given to strangers, 
at their Request, or may be lawfully possessed by them, because whatever remains uncultivated, 
is not to be esteemed a Property, only so far as concerns Jurisdiction, which always continues the 
Right of the ancient People. 
See Grotius, supra note 7, at II.2.17. 
 57 See generally TUCK, THE RIGHTS OF WAR, supra note 11, at 41. 
 58 Id. at 28–31. 
 59 Id. at 94 n.33. 
 60 Id. at 89 (quoting Grotius). 
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especially Islamic populations, the rights of domination were not 
geographically delineated and applied to non-Christians within the domestic 
borders of a nascent Western Europe.61 
In The Truth of the Christian Religion, Grotius presents a detailed series of 
arguments specifically condemning the religious and political systems of 
“Heathenism,” Judaism, and Islam.62 When Grotius turns to the “Heathen” 
religions, for instance, he justifies the superiority of Christianity on the basis of 
its rationality, virtue, and civility—to deny Christianity in favor of 
Heathenism, therefore, is to choose crude barbarism over a “delightful” and 
refined civility, wickedness over goodness, and ignorance over reason.63 In 
similar measure, the Jewish and Islamic populations are seen as dissonant, if 
not outright dangerous, elements within the emerging sovereign order of 
nation-states that must be routinized, if not eradicated.64 
The Jews, in his view, were “a people of so obstinate a disposition,” and 
their laws, archaic and absurd, to have “taken so deep root in the Minds of all 
the Hebrews, as never to be plucked out.”65 Observing that 
they have been driven out of their Country, [that] they have continued 
Vagabonds and despised, no Prophet has come to them, no Signs of 
their future Return; their Teachers, as if they were inspired with a 
Spirit of Giddiness, have sunk into base Fables, and ridiculous 
Opinions, with which the Books of the Talmud abound . . . .66 
Grotius argues that the reason the Jews are 
not heard [by God] . . . we must of Necessity conclude one of these 
Two Things, that either that Covenant made by Moses is entirely 
dissolved, or that the whole Body of the Jews are guilty of some 
grievous Sin, which has continued for so many Ages: And what that 
is, let them tell us themselves; or if they cannot say what, let them 
believe us, that That Sin is their despising the Messiah, who came 
before these Evils began to befall them.67 
In other words, the systematic persecution of Jews carried throughout the 
history of the respublica Christiania—whether under the guise of the Roman 
 
 61 Id. at 89–94 (discussing Grotius’s perspective on treaties with non-Christians). 
 62 GROTIUS, supra note 56, at 178–289. 
 63 See id. at 179–206 (discussing Heathenism). 
 64 See id. at 207–89 (discussing Judaism and Islam). 
 65 Id. at 23–24. 
 66 Id. at 243. 
 67 Id. at 244. 
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Catholic Church, the Emperor, Protestant princes, or the emerging state 
entities—did not reflect its own moral failing, but was due to the internal 
chemistry of both the Jewish psychology and institutional or cultural heritage, 
which bore the stain of God’s curse. 
Grotius professed a similar disdain for Islam, “the Mahometan Religion.”68 
To Grotius, Islam “was bred in Arms, breathes nothing else; and is propagated 
by such means only.”69 Grotius believed Islam had many times unjustly taken 
up arms 
against a People who no ways disturbed them, nor were taken Notice 
of any Injury; so that they could have no pretence for their Arms, but 
Religion, which is the most irreligious Thing that can be, for there is 
no Worship of God, but such as proceeds from a willing Mind.70 
Here, one could juxtapose these comments to Grotius’s early justifications for 
Christian nations to conquer and subjugate foreign people for violating laws of 
Nature or Nations.71 On the one hand, Grotius might have cynically been 
maintaining a rather crude double standard whereby regular Christian warfare 
was nevertheless an unrelated aberration to its core tenets and only mobilized 
when absolutely necessary to maintain what was a by-and-large peaceful 
communal existence. On the other hand, the turn to “naturalizing” Christian 
doctrine as “secular” may also have allowed him to differentiate between 
“religious” injury (which was not an acceptable pretext) and injury against the 
laws of Nature and Nations. Whatever the case, for Grotius, “Mahomet” 
himself was not only “a long time a robber, and always Effeminate,”72 who 
only attracted “Men void of Humanity and Piety,”73 and orchestrated a false 
religion, “which was plainly calculated for Bloodshed, delights much in 
Ceremonies; and would be believed, without allowing liberty to inquire into 
it.”74 Just as Grotius’s disposition towards the Jewish populations intimates the 
violent logic that would manifest itself in mutated form in Hitler’s death 
camps, many of the prejudices towards Islam in Grotius’s work seem to bear a 
resemblance to the rhetoric surrounding the ongoing “War on Terror,” and 
more generally, the struggle for liberal democratic governments throughout 
 
 68 Id. at 111. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. at 277–78. 
 71 TUCK, THE RIGHTS OF WAR, supra note 11, at 159–60. 
 72 GROTIUS, supra note 56, at 274. 
 73 Id. at 276. 
 74 Id. at 270. 
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Islamic countries: the idea that Islamic forms of government possess an almost 
innately violent character, the juxtaposition between liberal democratic models 
and intolerant totalitarian regimes, or alternatively secularism versus rigid 
dogmatisms, and so on.75 In this sense, perhaps writers like Lauterpacht and 
Nussbaum are right when they assert that the Grotian tradition lives on at the 
spiritual core of international law, but in a more perverse manner than either 
would care to openly contemplate.76 
III.  THE POLITICS OF RESTATEMENT AND DENIAL 
The 1999 inauguration of the Grotius Lecture Series by the American 
Society of International Law opened with a speech by the Vice President of the 
International Court of Justice, Judge Christopher Weeramantry, reflecting on 
the purpose of the lecture series and its namesake.77 In turning to recap the 
current atmosphere of the Grotian tradition and assessing its limitations and 
possibilities, it is worthwhile to reflect a moment upon a longer passage from 
this event: 
The inaugural Grotius lecture . . . is an occasion for deep 
reflection on the fundamentals of our discipline. It also is a moment 
to attempt to recapture the spirit of inspiration that moved this great 
pioneer of our discipline to struggle out of the limitations of the 
thought-frame of his times and carve out new pathways for 
international relations in the unchartered waters lying ahead. 
. . . . 
Grotius rose to the occasion—a towering intellect with a 
passionate vision of an ordered relationship among nations—a 
 
 75 TALAL ASAD, FORMATIONS OF THE SECULAR: CHRISTIANITY, ISLAM, MODERNITY 1–8, 113–19 (2003). 
In contemporary global governance, this theme is addressed by authors across a wide spectrum of academic 
disciplines, from international relations scholars (e.g., Elizabeth Hurd), to social anthropologists (e.g., Talal 
Asad), and philosophers (e.g., Alain Badiou). See, e.g., ELIZABETH HURD, THE POLITICS OF SECULARISM IN 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (2007); ALAIN BADIOU, THE CENTURY 165–78 (Alberto Toscano trans., English 
ed. 2007) (2005). Institutions within American foreign policy have also started to recognize this as an 
imminent strategic concern that goes by the coinage, “God Gap.” See David Waters, The ‘God Gap’ Impedes 
U.S. Foreign Policy, Task Force Says, WASH. POST (Feb. 24, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/23/AR2010022305103.html. 
 76 See Lauterpacht, supra note 48; see also NUSSBAUM, CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS, 
supra note 6, at 466–67. 
 77 See Christopher Weeramantry, The Grotius Lecture Series: Opening Tribute to Hugo Grotius, in 14 
AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1515, 1516 (1999). Both Weeramantry and Berman situate their conversation of 
international law in the tradition of Third World Approaches to International Law (“TWAIL”) scholars. 
Antony Anghie & B.S. Chimni, Third World Approaches to International Law and Individual Responsibility in 
Internal Conflicts, 2 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 77, 77 n.2 (2003). 
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relationship based not on the dogma of religion or the sword of 
conquest, but on human reason and experience. 
. . . . 
For Grotius’ contribution, all succeeding generations are in his 
debt. The new world order of European states that Grotius envisaged 
became a reality . . . . The nation-state system took over the  
world . . . . 
It was an eminently successful system for those nation states, but 
it was dangerous. Some would misread Grotius’ system as 
prescribing a lighted area of law and order for those within the fold, 
and an area of outer darkness for those without. 
. . . . 
That is now a past chapter. We are left with the aftermath of 
empire and task of cleaning up its problems. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . Like Grotius, we are seeking the friendly association of states and 
the peaceful resolution of disputes; we are also searching for 
principles of stability amidst the chaos of competing state  
interests. . . . [L]ike Grotius, we are experiencing a sudden expansion 
of knowledge and power never seen before.78 
In his response to Berman, Weeramantry goes on to say: 
Colonialism was a dark chapter in global history and it has 
fortunately ended. After the long twilight struggle of dying empires, 
we must prepare ourselves to sail beyond the sunset of that world 
order of justice, peace, and reconciliation. It is for us, international 
lawyers, to rise to this task.79 
The text above is a brilliant synthesis of traditional and contemporary 
feelings to explain the almost fetishistic hold of Grotius on the imagination of 
international lawyers. In Judge Weeramantry’s depiction, Grotius stands as a 
shining example of what international lawyers are at their best—drawing upon 
human reason, intelligence, and experience to civilize the “dogma of religion” 
and the “sword of conquest” through a “friendly association” of nation-states. 
This figure embodies the “sweet reasonableness” that Koskenniemi ascribed to 
Lauterpacht’s depiction of Grotius—the Victorian political reformer, armed 
with knowledge and compassion, searching out a “golden middle” between the 
 
 78 Weeramantry, supra note 77, at 1516–20. 
 79 See Christopher Weeramantry, The Grotius Lecture Series: A Response to Berman: In the Wake of 
Empire, in 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1515, 1569 (1999). 
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vagaries of apology and utopia.80 At the same time, however, the traditional 
emphasis on curbing “natural” anarchy through the self-enlightened 
cooperation and regulated intercourse of rules, norms, and institutions of 
sovereign nation-states is moderated by the shame and horrors of European 
imperialism, the “dark chapter in global history.”81 The importance of Grotius, 
 
 80 See Koskenniemi, supra note 48, at 215. Koskenniemi’s resuscitation of a Victorian reading of the 
Grotian tradition seems to self-consciously situate itself as the heir to the eclectic British jurist, Thomas Baty. 
Compare id., with THOMAS BATY, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN TWILIGHT 9–15 (1954). 
We are slipping into the same state of anarchic practice as that which in an earlier century 
aroused the indignation of Grotius. 
The task of any modern prophet of International Law who should seek to repeat for our age 
the achievement of Grotius is immeasurably harder than his. Grotius had two irrecusable 
authorities to which to appeal . . . The modern Grotius can find no such aid. . . . There is no 
vision. The world lies in twilight. 
International law . . . rests on the world’s common convictions . . . . 
If that twilight is not to deepen into dusk and darkness some unifying principle must be 
found. . . . Shall we be wrong in saying that Sweetness, Beauty and Honour make as wide an 
appeal to the common mind as anything else today? 
BATY, supra, at 13–15. Baty cites for the reader interested in following this theme to the work of his alter-ego, 
Irene Clyde, who wrote extensively on Victorian manners (e.g., the unseemliness of not only nudity or scant 
dress, but even sex of any persuasion) and the importance of a feminine ideal for personal and political 
governance. See generally IRENE CLYDE, EVE’S SOUR APPLES (1934). 
 81 Weeramantry, supra note 77, at 1569. TWAIL scholars, as well as their counterparts in the field of 
international relations, have followed up on the postcolonial literary tradition to bring the issue of cultural 
antagonism and ongoing forms of colonialism and imperialism to the forefront of international legal theory. 
See, e.g., Anghie & Chimni, supra note 77, at 77; MATTHEW CRAVEN, THE DECOLONIZATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: STATE SUCCESSION AND THE LAW OF TREATIES (2008); EDWARD KEENE, BEYOND THE 
ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: GROTIUS, COLONIALISM AND ORDER IN WORLD POLITICS 60–96 (2002); THIRD WORLD 
AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER: LAW, POLITICS AND GLOBALIZATION (Antony Anghie et al. eds., 2003); David 
Fidler, Revolt Against or From Within the West? TWAIL, the Developing World, and the Future Direction of 
International Law, 2 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 29 (2003); Peter Fitzpatrick & Eve Darian Smith, Laws of the 
PostColonial: An Insistent Introduction, in LAWS OF THE POSTCOLONIAL 1 (Peter Fitzpatrick & Eve Darian 
Smith eds., 1999); James T. Gathii, Alternative and Critical: The Contribution of Research and Scholarship on 
Developing Countries to International Legal Theory, 41 HARV. INT’L L.J. 263 (2000); Karin Mickelson, 
Taking Stock of TWAIL Histories, 10 INT’L COMMUNITY L. REV. 355–62 (2008); Makau Mutua, What is 
TWAIL?, AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 31 (2000); RALPH WILDE, INTERNATIONAL TERRITORIAL 
ADMINISTRATION (2008). At the same time, however, the genre is plagued by ambivalence towards the nature 
of its critique and the way forward—in particular, whether the issue is included or excluded from the current 
global order, or instead, some more fundamental structural critique. Here, post-development studies have for 
the most part remained neglected in the literature, though post-development itself has failed to offer an 
alternative proposal. See, e.g., THE DEVELOPMENT DICTIONARY: A GUIDE TO KNOWLEDGE AS POWER 
(Wolfgang Sachs ed., 1999) (criticizing itself often for not offering a programmatic or systemic alternative 
vision of global order). In relation to TWAIL, these tendencies are perhaps in part due to an over-reliance on 
European versus non-European antagonisms rather than looking at how the idea of Europe itself has 
historically always covered over deep “internal” hegemonic rivalries and competing ideological visions. But 
see David Harvey, Revolutionary and Counter Revolutionary Theory in Geography and the Problem of Ghetto 
Formation, 4 ANTIPODE 1 (1972). 
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therefore, is to remind international lawyers that the responsibility of the 
profession is to balance the contradictory needs of freedom and order, at once 
promoting political ambitions towards greater sociability (e.g., a fully inclusive 
global cosmopolitan order) while checking the excesses of political ambition 
(e.g., cultural or material imperialism). Just as Grotius stood against the tides 
of religious fundamentalism and violent political ambition, so too must 
international lawyers today transcend the allure of any form of zealous 
certainty (whether religious, national, and so on). Grotius comes to 
international lawyers who are searching for guidance like the voice of God out 
of the wilderness, giving clarity to past, present, and future and calling upon 
the profession to restate its (almost messianic) mission in an ever-ascending 
progression upwards, “into the sunrise of a new world order of justice, peace, 
and reconciliation.”82 At the end of the day, though not above the messy 
realities of human frailty and desire, international law is remembered in the 
dominant account of the Grotian tradition as a universalizing force of renewal 
and progress.83 
And yet, in light of the unearthed realities of Grotius’s positions, the 
curiosity remains: why does the literature of international law repeatedly fasten 
around his figure, continually misreading his efforts and his legacy in a 
consistent story of professional hope and affirmation? Indeed, if the Grotian 
tradition advocates international law as a politics of emancipation and 
restatement, it does so only by maintaining a politics of denial, not only 
concerning Grotius himself, but more importantly, about the nature and track 
record of its liberal cosmopolitanism project. To borrow from Lacanian 
terminology, one might say that the symbolic order that colors one’s 
argumentative patterns and imagination—the secular order and its professed 
formal agnosticism towards competing hegemonic claims84—is itself a 
response to some underlying trauma, that something which resists 
symbolization: namely, a non-eclipsed background that not only threatens 
western rationalities by “heightening contradictions and suppressions involved 
 
 82 Weeramantry, supra note 77, at 1569. See generally THOMAS SKOUTERIS, THE NOTION OF PROGRESS 
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW DISCOURSE (2010). 
 83 See Nathaniel Berman, The Grotius Lecture Series: In the Wake of Empire, in 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 
1515, 1521–54 (1999) (juxtaposing a “critical genealogist” voice to the standard progress narrative expounded 
by the “renewer/restate”). 
 84 See ERNESTO LACLAU, EMANCIPATION(S) (1996); MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF 
NATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870–1960, 413–509 (2001); Martti Koskenniemi, 
Formalism, Fragmentation, Freedom: Kantian Themes in Today’s International Law, 4 NO FOUNDATIONS J. 
EXTREME LEGAL POSITIVISM 7 (2007). 
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in their construction,”85 but more perversely, takes on the role of the Freudian 
death-instinct, compelling international law into an endlessly repetitive circular 
movement around a constitutive object that it dares not speak.86 Here, law 
functions as a sort of feedback loop that allows society to rationalize and 
sustain the violence and failures of its past and present, as the necessary 
limitations of human understanding, while holding on to the belief that its 
principles are fundamentally sound and coherent, a veritable standard to 
understand oneself in the world.87 In such a Lacanian understanding of the rule 
of law, the Grotian tradition is nothing short of the symbol of the existential 
anxiety among international lawyers over the complex array of human (and 
more importantly, Western) limitations, both personal and at large. 
What makes this trauma so difficult to disclose? The Author believes that 
the answer contains both a material and symbolic element. On the one hand, 
the emergence of international law cannot be discussed as a professional, 
modern discourse without turning to the nineteenth century experiences of both 
internal (domestic) and external (foreign) colonialism: at home, the violent 
suppression of working class needs,88 the brutality of industry’s “satanic 
mills,”89 famines and bloody intercontinental warfare,90 and abroad, the 
 
 85 PETER FITZPATRICK, THE MYTHOLOGY OF MODERN LAW 13 (1992). For Fitzpatrick, a founding figure 
in the British Critical Legal Studies movement, the effort to bring out these sublimated traumas are political 
acts of “internal decolonization” against the “white mythology” of mainstream international law. Id. at 13, 41. 
There is, however, both a contemporary and historical challenge to this aspiration. See Peter Danchin, The 
Emergence and Structure of Religious Freedom in International Law Reconsidered, XXIII J. L. RELIGION 455, 
459–60 (2007) (arguing persuasively that liberalism is founded on illiberal historical core of genocide and 
expulsion in the creation of sovereign nation-states); see also Anne Orford, Ritual, Mediation and the 
International Laws of the South, 16 GRIFFITH L. REV. 353 (2007) (pointing out more or less often in her work 
generally how the violence often decried in poor, or non-Western countries, is often the very sort of violence 
that European nation-states found instrumental in their formations). 
 86 See JUDITH BUTLER ET AL., CONTINGENCY, HEGEMONY, UNIVERSALITY: CONTEMPORARY DIALOGUES 
ON THE LEFT (2000). See generally REX BUTLER, ZIZEK: LIVE THEORY 25–27, 95–100 (2005); SIGMUND 
FREUD, BEYOND THE PLEASURE PRINCIPLE (1950) (discussing the “death instinct”); JACQUES LACAN, BOOK 
III: THE PSYCHOSES (Jacques-Alain Miller ed., 1993) (introducing the idea of the “forced choice”); SLAVOJ 
ZIZEK, ON BELIEF 103–05 (2001). 
 87 For a reading of this process in international legal theory in what he calls the ‘Feuerbach effect,’ see 
Akbar Rasulov, Universality, Lecture at the Institute for the Study of Political Economy and Law Seminar 
Series at the International University College of Turin (Mar. 4, 2011) (transcript on file with author). 
 88 See, e.g., E.P. THOMPSON, THE MAKING OF THE ENGLISH WORKING CLASS (1963); HOWARD ZINN, A 
PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (1980). 
 89 See William Blake, Milton, A Poem, in 5 THE ILLUMINATED BOOKS OF WILLIAM BLAKE 1 (Robert 
Essick & Joseph Viscomi eds., 1998). 
 90 See, e.g., THEODORE ALLEN, I THE INVENTION OF THE WHITE RACE (1994); ERIC HOBSBAWM, THE 
AGE OF REVOLUTION: EUROPE 1789–1848 (1962). In contrast to these texts, the dominant trend in historical 
literature—both legal and otherwise—is to stress the relatively peaceful, at least “stable” character of the early 
to middle nineteenth century, which contributes to a pacified version about the coming together of the Western 
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imperial conquest of foreign land through superior warfare technology and 
resources,91 the sanctimonious genocide of defeated populations,92 and 
colonialists and missionaries racked with disease in pursuit of fantasies.93 For 
international legal theorists and historians like Berman and Anghie, the same 
international law that one typically holds out as the protector of cultural respect 
and to check political aggression was itself forged in the fires of colonial 
conquest,94 far too savage and absolute to allow for any wishful reconciliatory 
redemption.95 Here, this nightmarish awakening is not only that we recognize 
the horrors committed by and upon our fathers and grandfathers, nor that its 
legacy lingers on despite our best efforts of structural adjustment and ethical 
denunciation—the trauma that we are almost compelled to disavow is that this 
past is not simply to be shunned, but also exists as our most intimate, secret 
dream: 
Colonialism is never the other, never the past, it is always with  
us . . . because it has made the world we live in, both in the ex-
metropoles and the ex-colonies: our culture, our economy, our very 
languages are imbued with the colonial past; with us because trauma 
(of destruction or of guilt) never really leaves an individual or a 
culture; and finally, with us, because colonialism is not only the 
shame of the West—its violent, shadow side—but rather, it also 
expressed some of Western culture’s highest ideal—that even today 
 
European system—a sort of “mythic” Europe that distances any critiques of endemic, or systemic violence at 
the core of the European state-order. Björn Hettne, Development and Security: Origins and Future, 41 
SECURITY DIALOGUE 30, 32 (2010). 
 91 See, e.g., S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 9–38 (2000); EDWARD 
SPICER, CYCLES OF CONQUEST: THE IMPACT OF SPAIN, MEXICO, AND THE UNITED STATES ON THE INDIANS OF 
THE SOUTHWEST, 1533–1960 (1962). 
 92 See, e.g., ADAM HOCHCHILD, KING LEOPOLD’S GHOST: A STORY OF GREED, TERROR, AND HEROISM IN 
COLONIAL AFRICA (1998). 
 93 See, e.g., MICHAEL OREN, POWER FAITH AND FANTASY: AMERICA IN THE MIDDLE EAST 1776 TO THE 
PRESENT 122–28, 200–09, 228–31 (2007). 
 94 ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 2–3 (2005) 
(“[S]overeignty . . . emerged out of the colonial encounter. . . . [C]olonialism was central to the constitution of 
international law in that many of the basic doctrines of international law . . . were forged out of the attempt to 
create a legal system that could account for relations between the European and non-European worlds in the 
colonial confrontation. . . . [T]hese origins create a set of structures that continuously repeat themselves . . . .”); 
see also Berman, supra note 83, at 1521–54. 
 95 Drawing upon Edouard Glissant’s writings about Caribbean history, Berman argues for a “fierce, even 
brutal honesty, refusing all redemptive consolations. . . . [He] rejects the heroic [foundational] myths [in favor 
of a] naked self-examination. Can international law, written by history’s victors, muster the courage to look 
frankly, painfully, at the horrors of its own past?” Berman, supra note 83, at 1554. 
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we cherish . . . . This is the real challenge . . . . [T]he horror . . . and 
the dream.96 
The violence here carries an overt materialist content, its scandalous 
political ramifications (e.g., structurally sustained gross inequality, cultural 
imperialism or genocide, policing actions, and warfare) the very stuff that 
everyone from neo-colonial critics and human rights activists to global policy 
makers and bureaucrats seek to (often very self-consciously) struggle against 
on one level or another.97 Yet, what is also touched upon is a more insidious 
form of violence, a symbolic violence, which is both more elusive, and which 
actually enlists and assigns one’s own desires by telling what can and cannot 
be said and accomplished.98 In other words, the rules and historical 
manifestations of authority, behavior, and beliefs that one lives by may very 
well be experienced as the taken for granted, axiomatic necessity of objective 
reality, but they are in fact culturally arbitrary phenomena in that they have no 
privileged connection to some natural or transcendent and universal truth.99 
These circumscribed moments are thereby transmitted through both historical 
baggage (diachronically) and everyday discourses (synchronically) as an 
almost unconscious background logic of understanding, compelling one to act 
and speak not so much unwillingly (for it is exactly our inability to separate 
 
 96 See Nathaniel Berman, The Alchemy of Empire, or of Power and Primitivism: Inaugural Lecture for 
the Centre for the study of Colonialism, Empire and International Law at the School of Oriental and African 
Studies (Feb. 1, 2008) (transcribed recording of the lecture on file with Author; any errors are solely the fault 
of the Author). 
 97 See David Kennedy, The Politics of the Invisible College: International Governance and the Politics 
of Expertise, 5 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 463, 463–97 (2001). 
 98 Symbolic violence is particularly apt in the context of law, which may be itself in some respects the 
concrete objectification of our anxieties—what the German philosopher Ernst Cassirer called, a 
“metamorphosis of fear.” CASSIRER, supra note 11, at 47. Unlike Spencer’s law of nervous discharge where 
we enjoy release from a sudden explosion of physical reaction, this metamorphosis into law may actual defer, 
and thereby intensify, our anxieties. Thus, the Goethe-like tendency to retreat into law to establish order—the 
“tendency to turn into an image . . . everything that delight[s] or trouble[s]” us—does not rectify our 
conceptions to the external world but actually incarnates, and heightens through repetition, our instincts of 
fear. Id. at 46–48. 
 99 The term itself, symbolic violence, was coined by Pierre Bourdieu, the late French sociologist and 
theorist, to denote how impositions of systems of symbolism and meaning (e.g., culture) upon groups and 
classes would be accepted as legitimate. PIERRE BOURDIEU, HOMO ACADEMICUS 27 (Peter Collier trans., 1990) 
(1984). Bourdieu was particularly interested in the role of “pedagogic action” in the French university system, 
which he believed functioned to perpetuate the advantages of privileged class relationships through inculcating 
students into processes of self-limitation and self-censorship. See id.; see also PIERRE BOURDIEU & LOIC J.D. 
WACQUANT, AN INVITATION TO REFLECTION SOCIOLOGY 62–259 (1992); RICHARD JENKINS, KEY 
SOCIOLOGISTS: PIERRE BOURDIEU (1994); BOURDIEU: A CRITICAL READER (Richard Shusterman ed., 1999). 
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our knowledge and desires from these conditions) as unwittingly.100 What 
makes it so difficult to locate these moments is that they appear immediately 
“naturalized” through stylized acts of repetition that are reciprocated, and 
ultimately lead to the appearance of an essentially ontological core.101 In short, 
one’s understanding of what one ought to do and the parameters one works 
within are aesthetically determined: less a matter of what actually exists, than 
how one performs and experiences the various forms, images, tropes, 
perceptions, and sensibilities that one identifies with international law.102 
In this sense, the anxiety that repeatedly draws international lawyers to 
Grotius is an underlying feeling of being caught in a catch-22 of fears. On the 
one hand, international lawyers labor under the “anxiety of influence,” that 
their vision and projects cannot live up to the creative victories of our 
ancestors, that global governance has become far too complex and uncertain to 
imagine any truly new world order.103 On the other hand, even if such a 
possibility existed, the lessons of the past are not completely lost in the 
 
 100 Diachronic refers to the historically constituted, or developed, nature of meaning and interpretation. 
Synchronic denotes meaning produced by a system at any given point in time. See TERRY EAGLETON, 
LITERARY THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 96–97 (2d ed. 1996). For many authors, these two approaches go hand 
in hand. See, e.g., THE BAKHTIN READER: SELECTED WRITINGS OF BAKHTIN, MEDVEDEV, VOLOSHINOV 5 (Pam 
Morris ed., 1994) (1986). For a legal discussion of the synchronic play of structuralists, and how it may be 
engaged in legal analysis, see David Kennedy, Critical Theory, Structuralism and Contemporary Legal 
Scholarship, 21 NEW ENG. L. REV. 209, 248–89 (1986) (providing an extensive list of relevant materials for 
further research). 
 101 This idea is indebted to the notion of the American philosopher and cultural and feminist theorist 
Butler’s idea of “performativity.” See JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE (1990). In her 1993 book, Bodies 
That Matter, Butler links the idea of performativity to the idea of “iterability” in the work of French literary 
theorist and philosopher, Derrida. JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER: ON THE DISCURSIVE LIMITS OF 
“SEX” 245 (1993).  
Performativity cannot be understood outside of a process of iterability, a regularized and 
constrained repetition of norms . . . . [T]his repetition . . . constitutes the temporal condition for 
the subject. . . . This iterability implies that “performance” is not a singular “act” . . . but a 
ritualized production, a ritual reiterated under and through constraint, under and through the force 
of prohibition and taboo, with the threat of ostracism and even death controlling and compelling 
the shape of the production, but not . . . determining it fully in advance. 
Id. at 95; see also Jacques Derrida, Signature, Event, Context, in LIMITED INC. 1 (Jeffrey Mehlman & Samuel 
Weber trans., 1988) (1977). 
 102 See Pierre Schlag, The Aesthetics of American Law, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1047, 1049–54 (2002). Schlag 
takes care to distance himself from an understanding of aesthetics as “the appreciation of art and beauty” to 
offer four “aesthetic” models which account for the various ways American lawyers perceive and arrive at 
outcomes in law, which he believes acts as a formal enterprise whereby “ethical dreams and political  
ambitions . . . do their work.” Id. at 1049. 
 103 See generally HAROLD BLOOM, THE ANXIETY OF INFLUENCE: A THEORY OF POETRY (1973); see also 
HAROLD BLOOM, KABALLAH AND CRITICISM (1975). 
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subconscious of the discipline, that any political order, whether it expresses 
itself as totalitarian or liberal, is dependent on some original (and maintained) 
condition of violent, exclusionary force. Tolerance, in this respect, is not so 
much a virtue or goal, as it is the condition of a particular situation of comfort 
or authority, the rationalization of how violence will be organized and directed 
once a system disclaims its propensity to violence. In response to these 
anxieties, international lawyers have sought Grotius to either “obscure the 
historically exclusionary origins of the Western liberal state” by emphasizing 
his magnanimous advocacy of liberal tolerance and formal equality, or 
alternatively, decried his theory as self-serving justifications for empire,104 
thereby eliciting a subtle polemic for an acceptance of the status quo one or 
two degrees to the left, some cautious politics of piecemeal reform and mutual 
distrust. 
CONCLUSION: A POLITICS OF TRUTH105 
And yet, in the wake of what would otherwise look like false celebration or 
grim resignation, the words of Judge Weeramantry still carry a portion of hope. 
To remember Grotius is, for Weeramantry, a “moment to attempt to recapture 
the spirit of inspiration . . . to struggle out of the limitations of the thought-
frame of [one’s] times and carve out new pathways . . . in the uncharted waters 
lying ahead.”106 Out of this come two suggestions for seizing upon 
Weeramantry’s appeal and answering the Grotian tradition in a new light. First, 
rather than shy away from the partisan nature of Grotius’s convictions, we 
 
 104 HAROLD BLOOM, supra note 103.  
 105 This might be juxtaposed with the various calls of “radical democracy,” see Laclau, supra note 84, at 
105, or their legal equivalent, the “culture of formalism,” see Koskenniemi, supra note 84, at 502–09. At its 
most appealing, the call for a “culture of formalism” challenges the international legal community to rise 
above the “politics of the possible” to embrace a higher standard, though like its American humanitarian rule 
of law counterpart, carries the tendency to recognize itself as a restraining, or gentle, civilizing force outside 
the auspices of power, and more specifically, war. Id. Instead, what the author is searching for here is 
something more akin to a “politics of truth,” which seems to occasionally manifest both within and outside of 
legal theory—in nineteenth century European political philosophy (Giuseppi Mazzini, see WIGHT, supra note 
29), in the nineteenth century and twentieth century American pragmatic “can-do” ethos (as drawn out by 
authors within international law, particularly Mark Janis, see MARK WESTON JANIS, AMERICA AND THE LAW 
OF NATIONS 1776–1939 (2010), and David Kennedy, see KENNEDY, supra note 32), in the liberation struggles 
in Latin America (Gustavo Gutierrez Merino, see Gustavo Gutiérrez, LIBERATION THEOLOGY, 
liberationtheology.org/people-organizations/Gustavo-gutierrez (last visited Apr. 2, 2010)) and anti-colonial 
struggles of the twentieth century (emphasized in legal work particularly by TWAIL authors, see Anghie & 
Chimni, supra note 77), and in more recent years, within the philosophical writings of authors such as Alain 
Badiou and Alberto Toscano, BADIOU, supra note 75. 
 106 See Weeramantry, supra note 77, at 1515–20. 
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might instead accept them as the very conditions of any emancipatory 
politics.107 No victory, no good, came to any group of humans without what 
was most often passionate and protracted struggle, usually with countless and 
unsung casualties. That there will be losers and excluded parties are not an 
unfortunate by-product of the political world, but the very purpose of struggle: 
to fight for some condition that will change the distribution and well-being of 
particular individuals and communities always comes as theft and sacrifice to 
others. To open up patents on necessary drugs to poor countries, for instance, 
will mean the loss of a particular form of property and profit for shareholders 
invested in the pharmaceutical industry. Let us say, so be it. As progressive 
international lawyers committed to a better world, let us leave the comforts of 
the condemnation of warfare and venture forward into some battle, whatever 
that might be.108 
Second, contemporary international lawyers sympathize with Grotius’s 
eclectic use of sources (nowadays under the rubric of inter-disciplinarity), but 
too often “appear both ashamed of their inability to propound doctrine in the 
imperious tone of traditional texts” and “proud of having avoided the 
[methodological] difficulties plaguing each traditional scheme of authority.”109 
While international law should by no means lose sight of the lessons and 
(partial) victories against oppression (whether that was expressed as child 
labor, homophobia, racism, sexism, and so on), too often the condition of 
accepting any principle only when methodologically defensible leads to a 
retreat into some politics not simply of humility, but deferral.110 In contrast, for 
 
 107 See generally KENNEDY, supra note 32 (drawing out an ethical appeal for a partisan courage to face 
the “dark sides” of progressive struggle as the very basis of personal and political freedom); see also ALAIN 
BADIOU, SAINT PAUL: THE FOUNDATION OF UNIVERSALISM (Ray Brassier trans., English ed. 2003) (1997); 
Alberto Toscano, Fanaticism: A Brief History of the Concept, EUROZINE (July 12, 2006), http://www.eurozine. 
com/articles/2006-12-07-toscano-en.html. 
 108 See generally Toscano, supra note 107. 
 109 See Kennedy, supra note 5, at 5–7. 
 110 This politics of deferral seems to me less constructed on a sentiment of humility but resignation, and 
which tacitly accepts the “false necessity” about the nature and outcomes of global governance. See 1 
ROBERTO UNGER, POLITICS, A WORK IN CONSTRUCTIVE SOCIAL THEORY, FALSE NECESSITY: ANTI-
NECESSITARIAN SOCIAL THEORY IN THE SERVICE OF RADICAL DEMOCRACY (2004); see also QUENTIN 
MEILLASSOUX, AFTER FINITUDE: AN ESSAY ON THE NECESSITY OF CONTINGENCY (2008). Arguing against 
Kantian subjectivity, Meillassoux argues provocatively for us to accept arbitrariness as the sole and necessary 
absolute of existence—what he terms, a “radical contingency.” MEILLASSOUX, supra, at 60–61. 
We are no longer upholding a variant of the principle of sufficient reason . . . but rather the 
absolute truth of a principle of unreason. There is no reason for anything to be or to remain the 
way it is; everything must, without reason, be able not to be and/or be able to be other than it is. 
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Grotius, authoritative diversity was neither virtue nor vice, but simply a fact of 
life. To put this in a more contemporary register, any principle or truth is 
ultimately unanswerable according to any empirical or rational basis, but 
simply “evident” to its adherents. Instead of remaining caught in the spurious 
infinity of negation that haunts the post-foundational landscape of politics and 
law, the memory of Grotius and his eclectic boldness directs international 
lawyers to proclaim a fidelity to a truth without apology.111 The Grotian 
tradition calls on international law to shake off the Victorian pieties that 
shackle its emancipatory potential. 
 
Id. For an experiment to bring Meillassoux’s argument into legal human rights theory, see BILL BOWRING, THE 
DEGRADATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER? THE REHABILITATION OF LAW AND THE POSSIBILITY OF 
POLITICS 99–110 (2008). But see Susan Marks, False Contingency, 62 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 1 (2009). 
 111 See generally BADIOU, supra note 107; ALAIN BADIOU, THEORIE DU SUJET (1981). 
